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INTRODUCTION

The oldest religious exemption from neutral laws is the excusal of religious,
conscientious objectors from combatant military service.2 The exemption pre-dates
the Constitution. 3 The Massachusetts and Rhode Island colonies initially granted
exemptions for conscientious objectors from military service during the Seventeenth
Century,4 and similar exemptions were in place in virtually all of the colonies by the
time of the American Revolution.5
The early federal government did not have its own draft, so it had no need to
consider exemptions for religious objectors to military service.' Nevertheless, the
issue had sufficient salience during the founding period such that James Madison
authored a proposal to include a constitutionally based right for religious exemptions
from military service in the Bill of Rights.' That constitutional provision did not
pass; but Congress provided an exemption for conscientious objectors after it instilled
the country's first military draft during the Civil War and when it next imposed a
draft in World War I. Since that time, the United States has continued to exempt
religious objectors from subsequent drafts and wars.'
As the oldest religious exemption, the exclusion of religious objectors from
combatant military service has obvious implications for the contemporary debate over
whether religious exemptions that impose third-party burdens violate the
Establishment Clause.' 0 Its relevance and importance, however, stand not only on its

2 Unless otherwise indicated, the term 'conscientious objector' is used in this Article
solely to describe
a person who is conscientiously opposed to war or military combatant service, and not to persons who may
be conscientiously opposed to other obligations imposed by the state.
3 KENT GREENAWALT, EXEMPTIONS: NECESSARY, JUSTIFIED, OR MISGUIDED? 23-25 (2016);
see alsoJohn Whiteclay Chambers II, Conscientious Objectors and the American State from Colonial
Times to the Present, in THE NEW CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: FROM SACRED TO SECULAR
RESISTANCE 23, 25-28 (Charles C. Moskos &John Whiteclay Chambers II eds., 1993).
4 NICHOLAS A. KREHBIEL, GENERAL LEWIS B. HERSHEY AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
DURING WORLD WAR 1129 (2011).
R.R. Russell, Development of ConscientiousObjectorRecognition in the United States, 20 GEO.

WASH. L. REv. 409, 414 (1952).
6 See GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 25.
1 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 451
(Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834) (1789).
See Chambers, supra note 3, at 29-30, 32-33.
See Charles C. Moskos &John Whiteclay Chambers II, The Secularization of Conscience,in THE

NEW CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: FROM SACRED TO SECULAR RESISTANCE, supra note 3, at 3,13-14.
"0 See e.g. Frederick Mark Gedicks &

Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from

the

ContraceptionMandate:An UnconstitutionalAccommodationofRehgion, 49 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REv.
343 (2014); Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third Party Harms, and the Establishment

Clause, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1375, 1383 (2016); Thomas C. Berg, Religious Exemptions and ThirdPary Harms, Federalist

Soc'y

Rev.,

Oct. 2016;

Nelson

Tebbe

et

al.,

When

Do Religious

Accommodations Burden Others?, in The Conscience Wars: Rethinking the Balance Between Religion,

Identity, and Equality (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds.) (forthcoming May 2018); Richard
Garnett, Accomodation, Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 Vand. L. rev. En Banc 39 (2014).;
Mark Storslee, ReligiousAccommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-ParryHarm,86 U. Chi.
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historical pedigree. The conscientious objector provision also offers the most
dramatic example of the religious exemption/third-party burden dilemma." On the
one side, there may be no greater intrusion on religious conscience than being
required to kill.12 On the other, there may be no greater burden imposed on a third
party than that created by excusing the conscientious objector from combatant
military service, because the burdens of military service then fall on a third party
conscripted in the objector's place.' 3 The third party then becomes the person
potentially compelled to take the life of another-and, not incidentally, the person
forced to risk his or her own life as well.' 4 The conscientious-objector exemption
example thus presents the religious exemption/third-party burden issue in a context
where the stakes on both sides are at their highest. One might think, therefore, that
it would provide a particularly clear vision into the intricacies of this issue.
There is one other reason why issues surrounding conscientious-objector
exemptions to war are potentially relevant to the contemporary debate over religious
exemptions and third-party burdens. Conscientious-objector exemptions have been,
and continue to be, deeply controversial. Whether conscientious-objector
exemptions should (or must) be granted-and, if so, how broadly they should be
drawn-have provoked intense political and legislative debate since their inception. 5
Some of these disputes, moreover, have triggered legal challenges-including cases
that have led to major Supreme Court decisions.' 6 Conscientious objection to war
thus provides a long and substantial track record for the arguments both for and
against religious exemptions. One might expect therefore that there would be much
to learn from this history regarding concerns for third-party burdens.
This Article accordingly reviews the history and the debates surrounding
conscientious objection to war in order to determine what insights, if any, these
accounts offer in relation to the religious exemption/third-party burden
question. Part I canvasses the relevant background. It traces the history of
conscientious-objection exemptions and reviews the key Supreme Court

L.

Rev.

(forthcoming

2019),

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3 136753f

[https://perma.cc/L4EK-JTSW].

11 GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 23 ("[T]he quintessential exception for individuals from general
duties imposed on others has involved pacifists not being required to perform as military
personnel .... ).
12 See Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original
Understandingofthe Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1808 (2006).
13 Christopher C. Lund, supra note 10 at 1383 ("[I]f [conscientious] objectors are replaced by drafted
substitutes, that third-party burden is extraordinary.").
14 Carl H. Esbeck, When Religious Exemptions Cause Third-PartyHarms: Is the Establishment
Clause Violated?, 59 J. CHURCH & ST. 357, 376 (2017) ("For every conscientious objector excused from
service, another unwilling soldier is pressed into military service with the risk of injury or death.").
15 Sectarian pacifists in the colonies, for example, were fined, jailed, and had their property confiscated
for not completing their mandatory militia duties as early as 1658. Chambers, supra note 3, at 25.
Eventually, all colonies, except Georgia, provided militia exemptions to those who opposed bearing arms
on religious grounds, although many were still forced to pay high fines, march with the militia, or be held
in the stockades during wartime. Id. at 26-27.
16 See infra Section
I.C.
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conscientious-objector cases in search of material that might reflect how the concern
for third-party burdens has influenced the political and legal debates surrounding
conscientious objection. As Part I shows, however, this search comes up surprisingly
empty. The history and the case law are replete with arguments that granting
conscientious-objector exemptions will cause certain generalized harms, such as
weakening a colony's defense or undercutting military service morale." Yet almost
nothing in the record suggests that a concern for the third parties drafted in place of
conscientious objectors has had any role in shaping the conscientious exemption
debate.
Part II responds to two separate anticipated responses to the conclusion in Part
I: that the third-party burden issue has historically been absent in the debates and
litigation surrounding conscientious objection to war. Part II.A. answers the
potential objection that the historical record actually does evidence a concern for
third-party burdens. Part II.B. responds to the possible argument that the reason
why the third-party burden has been absent from the debates surrounding

" As Frederick Gedicks and Rebecca Van Tassell have explained, "third-party burden" means a
substantial burden imposed on identifiable third parties and not burdens experienced more generally. See
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, supranote 10 at 364-65. Thus, in the Hobby Lobby
case, the third-party claim was that exempting a for-profit corporation from having to provide
contraceptive coverage was problematic because it imposed a specific burden on the company's employees
who would be forced to find their own insurance coverage. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2751, 2790 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 93 (Cal. 2004)). It was not that its competitors might suffer a generalized
sense of unfairness because Hobby Lobby would be especially excused from an obligation while they were
not.
In the context of conscientious objection, the relevant third-party burden is the one suffered by the
person conscripted into military service in order to replace the excused objector. It is not other effects,
such as the weakening of a community's defenses by reducing available manpower or the undermining of
public morale by having some citizens perceived as not bearing their fair share of community
responsibility. Those effects are certainly serious, and may strongly militate against granting or expanding
conscientious objector exemptions, but they are not third-party harms.
Defining the third-party burden in this manner makes sense. The protection of any constitutional
right will inevitably impose some burden on third-parties; and that is also the true with respect to religious
exemptions - whether they are constitutionally or statutorily-based. See Lund, supranote 10, at 1383-84.
For example, when the Court held that South Carolina must grant Adell Sherbert an exemption from
unemployment insurance requirements because she could not work on Saturdays for religious reasons,
that meant taxpayers would have to cover the cost of her payments. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
399-400, 406, 410 (1963). Yet, as Gedicks and Van Tassell point out, that sort of "barely measurable"
harm does not equate to a cognizable third-party burden. See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 10 at
364. Even the Court's holding that Gregory Holt was to be excused for religious reasons from prison
regulations governing facial hair imposed some costs on states, in that the governments would have to
examine religions exemption claims in order to decide who is, or is not, eligible. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135
S. Ct. 853, 860-61, 867 (2015). The third-party claim, then, if construed as including the imposition of
generalized harms rather than burdens on specific individuals, would suggest that common religious
exemptions would be problematic on that count alone. See Thomas C. Berg, supra note 10 at 50, 60; see
also Nelson Tebbe et al.,supra note 10 (noting that the third-party burden doctrine must have limits).
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conscientious objection is because third parties who serve in place of conscientious
objections are not actually 'burdened' in a manner that raises constitutional concern.
Part III then analyzes the possible implications from the fact that the third-party
issue has been absent from the conscientious-exemption debates. The section first
discusses the possibility that the historical absence of a concern for third-party
burdens in the conscientious objector debates indicates that third-party burdens are
not relevant factors in adjudging religious exemptions. The section then addresses
the opposite inference-that Congress and the courts have not properly accounted
for third-party burdens in their treatment of conscientious objection, and the legality
of the exemption should therefore be revisited in light of third-party concerns. Last,
the section considers a third alternative-that there are particular reasons why the
experience with conscientious objection to war does not translate into other
religious-exemption issues. As this section demonstrates, none of these alternatives
provide the obvious solution. Part IV offers a brief conclusion.
I. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO WAR
A. Background
The religious objection to war is thought to have arisen among Christians who
lived on the frontiers of the Roman Empire in the early centuries A.D." The belief
likely derives from Christ's Sermon on the Mount, and its powerful call for
nonresistance in response to violence." The first known Christian objector was
Maximillian from Numidia in North Africa, who refused to serve in the Roman
2
20
Army in 295 A.D. He was executed for his resistance. 1
Christian beliefs as to the scope of the religious objection to war varied by time
period and differed among sects. 22 The prominent belief in early Christianity was
that all wars were objectionable, though not all Christians at that time adhered to
that tenet. 23 By the Fourth Century, however, Christian theology had largely moved
from the opposition to all wars to the opposition to 'unjust wars'-a development
that was precipitated, at least in part, by the reality that after Constantine
Christianity had become the state religion and was unavoidably involved in the
24
defense of the Empire.
The belief in pacifism reemerged during the middle ages in some small Christian
sects. 25 It then arose again in the Reformation among other Christian denominations,
1" PETER BROCK, THE ROOTS OF WAR RESISTANCE: PACIFISM FROM THE EARLY CHURCH TO
TOLSTOY 9 (1981).
'9 See id. at 9; see also United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Chambers, supra note 3, at 25-26.
20Moskos & Chambers, supranote 9, at 9.
21

Id.

22 See BROCK, supra note 18, at 9-18; see also Moskos & Chambers, supranote 9, at
9.
23 BROCK, supra note 18, at 9-12.
24 See id. at 12-13.
25 See BROCK, supra note 18, at 13.
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including the Anabaptists and Quakers.2 Members of those sects, in turn, brought
their pacifistic beliefs with them when they emigrated to America. 27
Life in the early colonies, however, was not readily conducive to the maintenance
of pacifist beliefs. 28 Faced with the constant threat of attack, the colonies formed
citizen militia to defend their communities and presumed that "all able-bodied males
in the settlement held the responsibility of defense." 29 Accordingly, they required
that "every male citizen between certain ages ... would keep himself armed and be
subject to call as a member of the colonial militia force."30
Because of their religious convictions, many members of the pacifist sects refused
to serve in the colonial militias.3 ' This resistance triggered its own opposition. Some
objectors were prosecuted by the colonies under laws that punished those who
refused to serve with fines, jail time, or property confiscation.3 2 Many were subject
to serious physical attacks by private individuals for not accepting military service.33
As one writer explains, conscientious objectors faced "[p]ersecution for this
stance .

.

. almost as soon as they arrived in the colonies."34

Eventually, the colonies began to enact conscientious-objector provisions
beginning, as noted above, with Massachusetts and Rhode Island.35 These religious
exemptions tended to be narrow in scope and limited to recognized pacifist sects.36
In addition, concerns that objectors were "getting off too easily" led some of the
colonies to require that those exempted provide a substitute or pay a commutation
fee.37 Some also allowed those who desired to avoid military service to do so by paying
a fee or providing a substitute even when not motivated by religions conscience.38
The progression towards exempting religious objectors from military service,
however, was not linear. Pacifists continued to be persecuted (even in the colonies
that granted them conscientious-objector status);39 and, outside of colonies such as
26 Moskos & Chambers, supra note 9, at 9-11.
27 See id.
21

See Chambers, supra note 3, at 26-28.

29 KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 27.
30 Russell, supra note 5, at 412.
31 See id.
32

Chambers, supra note 3, at 25-27.

33 See id at 27; see also KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 29.
34 KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 29.
35 Id. at 29, 31-32 (stating Quakers, Mennonites, and Brethren were often explicitly included in
colonies' religious-exemption laws); see also Russell, supra note 5, at 413-14.
36 Russell, supra note 5, at 413.
37

Id. at 414.

31 Id. at 413-14, 414 n.18. The option of furnishing a substitute was seldom used by religious

objectors because doing so also violated their religious principles. Quakers and Mennonites, for example,
refused to hire substitutes, "seeing that practice as little more than sending another man to kill and shed
blood in one's place, making them complicit in taking another life." KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 30. The
largest pacifist sect, the Quakers, also believed paying fines or providing labor to the military violated their
religious beliefs. See id. at 30.
39 During the French and Indian War of 1756-1763, "many colonial governments stiffened the fines
and sometimes forced young pacifist Quakers, Mennonites, and Brethren to march with the militia or
provincial forces or be confined in a military stockade." Chambers, supra note 3, at 27. Quakers would
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Pennsylvania, where pacifists held significant political power, political opposition to
conscientious exemption remained considerable. 40
The arguments raised against conscientious exemption during this period were
multiple. Some protested that excusing pacifists from militia service deprived the
community of the necessary manpower to maintain an adequate defense.4 Many
criticized the exemptions on the ground that they allowed persons to escape
shouldering their fair share of community responsibility.42 Others claimed pacifist
sects were false religions and that those seeking exemptions from service were frauds,
traitors, or both.43
One argument that did not explicitly appear during this time was the assertion
that conscientious objection should be opposed because third parties would be
required to serve in place of the objectors. That absence, however, makes sense.
Because the colonies required every able-bodied man in a certain age range to serve
in the militia,44 an assertion that a third party would have to serve in the exempted
conscientious objector's place would be inaccurate. The third party had to serve anyway.45
The one place where the concern with third party burdens may have been
implicitly recognized was Pennsylvania. Because Quakers made up such a substantial
percentage of the population of that colony,46 the consequences of exempting
conscientious objectors from a draft would have been particularly severe.47 There is,
therefore, some suggestion in the Pennsylvania debates over conscientious objection
that a concern with third-party burdens might have been considered.48

also have their property seized by sheriffs and county militia lieutenants to cover the cost of unpaid fines
and substitute fees. Id. at 27.
40 See KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 28-30. Eventually, to appease England's demand for more troops
during the French and Indian War, the Quaker government of Pennsylvania passed legislation that would
give money for the military expenses, "end[ing] ... the 'holy experiment' of the Quaker government in
Pennsylvania." Id. at 30.
41 See Chambers, supra note 3, at 27 (noting the tension surrounding conscientious objection during

the French and Indian War of 1756-1763).
42 See id.; see also KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 27-30 (describing the militia as a "community-based
organization" that originally required all able-bodied men join).
43 See Laycock, supra note 12, at 1817-18.
44 KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 27.
45 To be sure, there was an argument that excluding objectors would increase the severity of the
burdens incurred by those who continued to serve in the militia, but that burden would be a matter of
degree and not of kind. See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 10, at 364-66 (arguing that marginal
increases in pre-existing burdens do not arise to cognizable third-party burdens).
46 See Russell, supra note 5, at 413 (explaining that the colony did not have a militia until 1755, and
the militia was purely volunteer-based).
47 Laycock, supranote 12, at 1808, 1825 (noting that the effects of granting conscientious exemptions
in Pennsylvania would be particularly pronounced because of the large numbers of Quakers).
41 Id. at 1821-22 (referencing the statements of Reverend Francis Alison and asserting "the essential
distinction" between proper and excessive exercise of religion is to "protect religious liberty up to the point
at which it burdens or oppresses others, and no further").
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B. FederalConscientious-ObjectorProvisions
Although political resistance remained, exempting religious objectors was widely
accepted by the time of the Revolutionary War.49 In 1775, the Continental Congress
passed a resolution recognizing those "who, from religious principles, cannot bear
arms," and then requesting that those persons "do all other services to their oppressed
[c]ountry, which they can consistently with their religious principles."" In addition,
as noted above, James Madison proposed that a right to conscientious objection be
in included in the Second Amendment to the Bill of Rights." That provision passed
the House, although it did not prevail in the Senate.5 2 There is no indication,
however, that a concern for third parties contributed to its defeat, or, for that matter,
was even raised in the debates. 53
Third party burden concerns were also absent from the debates over
conscientious objection in 1790, when Congress considered passing the Uniform
Militia Act, a provision that would have imposed a federal military service
requirement upon all eligible males. As originally drafted, the Act exempted certain
classes of citizens from service provided they paid a commutation fee; but some
members of Congress wanted to broaden the provision to allow those whose religious
scruples prevented them from paying a fee to be exempt without payment. 54 This
broadened exemption, as Mark Storslee explains, actually did trigger establishment
concerns.5 5 But the establishment objection was that the provision created an
incentive for persons to adopt a particular religious view. 6 It was not based on third
party burdens.
In the end, Congress did not pass the Uniform Militia Act, instead leaving the
matter of conscientious objection to the states. Accordingly, pre-Civil War, it was
the states, rather than the federal government, that provided the rules governing
conscientious objection.57 The states' treatment of conscientious objection largely
replicated the colonial legislation.5 ' They generally continued to excuse conscientious
objectors from their militias and to limit conscientious-objection eligibility to those

49 See Chambers, supra note 3, at 27-28.

o 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 189 (Worthington Chauncey

Ford ed., 1905) (1775).
51

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

52 Chambers, supra note 3, at 29.

5 See Laycock, supra note 12, at 1810
54 See Storslee, supra note 10 (manuscript at 15).

Id.

6 Id. (manuscript

at 34). Storslee describes the anti-establishment concern at issue as the objection
to government-induced conformity. Id. (manuscript at 7).
17 See Russell, supra note 5, at 417. According to Robert Miller and William Flowers, "When the
first militia law was passed by Congress in 1792, there was some discussion as to the advisability of
providing exemptions for conscientious objectors; finally, a decision was made to leave the matter to the
states." ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY:
CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 146 (Markham Press Fund 1982) (1977).
s See Russell, supra note 5, at 417.
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from well-recognized pacifist churches and/or those who paid commutation fees or
provided substitutes.5
Conscientious objector provisions, however, continued to be controversial and
resisted on the same grounds that they had been in the colonies.60 Nevertheless, the
argument that exemptions should be opposed because would they force others to
serve in the place of the objector was not a part of the political discourse.
The first federal draft was initiated during the Civil War in 1863 after other
efforts to recruit soldiers into the Union Army proved insufficient.' The original
version of the Draft Act, as it was called, did not have a conscientious-objector
exemption, but did allow persons to avoid the draft by providing a substitute or
paying a commutation fee.62 Drafted conscientious objectors were sometimes subject
to extreme abuse, which apparently worked only to increase the pacifists' resolve and
politicians' sympathies.63 Subsequently, in 1864, Congress amended the Draft Act
with a true conscientious objector provision.6 4 That measure allowed that:
[M]embers of religious denominations, who shall by oath or affirmation
declare that they are conscientiously opposed to the bearing of arms, and
who are prohibited from doing so by the rules and articles of faith and
practice of said religious denominations, shall, when drafted into the
military service, be considered non-combatants, and shall be assigned by
the Secretary of War to duty in the hospitals, or to the care of freedmen,
or shall pay the sum of three hundred dollars to such person as the
Secretary of War shall designate to receive it, to be applied to the benefit
65
of the sick and wounded soldiers .
Most objectors apparently opted for the payment of the fee rather than engage in
alternative service;66 although some pacifists refused both options and eventually had
7
to be paroled.

See id. at 413, 417.
See Laycock, supra note 12, at 1808.
61 Russell, supra note 5, at 418. The Confederate States instituted their draft in April 1862. Id. at
419. The first version of the Confederate Act did not exempt religious objectors, although it did allow for
substituted service. Id. Six months later, however, the Confederate Congress amended the law to allow
religious exemptions for members of certain, specifically identified sects as long as those seeking
exemption furnished a substitute or paid a commutation fee. Id.; see also Chambers, supm note 3, at 29-30.
62 Russell, supra note 5, at
418.
63 Chambers, supra note 3, at 30-31 ("Some objectors were strung up by their thumbs,
tied down in
a crouch, pricked with bayonets, threatened with execution, or prodded into battle with muskets tied to
their backs. One Southern objector was hanged, and another died of debilitation from exposure. . ..
Although such severe punishment was exceptional, harassment and brief imprisonment were quite
common.").
64 Russell, supra note 5, at 418-19.
59

6o

6'

Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 6, 9.

66

Russell, supra note 5, at 419.
Chambers, supra note 3, at 31.

67
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The United States did not employ a draft again until World War I when it
enacted the Selective Draft Act of 1917.68 At that time, a conscientious-objection
exception was considered with hesitancy. 9 President Woodrow Wilson and
Secretary of War Newton Baker initially worried a religious conscientious-objection
exemption would be exploited by those against the war for reasons other than
religious principle.70
Conscientious-objector exemptions generated opposition on other grounds as
well." Former President Theodore Roosevelt, for example, fiercely denounced
conscientious objection, stating in one speech that:
The conscientious objector . . . curtains his cowardice behind the

statement that he objects to placing himself in a position where he might
take part in killing some one [sic]. I'd guard his conscience. I'd send him
to the front, but I wouldn't give him a gun. I'd put him to digging kitchen
sinks and trenches so that good men could rest until the time came for them
to kill someone. Then I'd watch his conscience to see what it would do. 72
Not raised during the debates, however, was the argument that granting exemptions
to religious objectors would improperly impose burdens on third parties.
Ultimately, the Selective Draft Act included a conscientious exemption that was
limited to members of "well-recognized" religious sects or organizations whose
"creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form."73 It allowed
for alternative service; setting forth that those exempted would not be excused from
"service in any capacity that the President shall declare to be noncombatant."74 The
World War I legislation, however, did not allow persons to avoid the draft by finding
substitutes or paying commutation fees."
During World War I, 64,700 men filed for conscientious-objector status, of
which 56,800 were granted that status. 6 22,873 of those were eventually drafted.
This is in comparison with the 24 million men that were registered under the World
War I draft, and the 2.8 million who were actually inducted." At least 16,000 of the
objectors ended up renouncing their status." This was in part because they were
6s

See Russell, supra note 5, at 420.

69 See Chambers, supra note 3, at 32.

70 Id. (stating that roughly half of the U.S. population opposed the country's entry into the war for a
range of reasons, including isolationist ideologies, opposition to Allied Powers, and both secular and
religious conscientious objections).
" See id at 32-33.
72 Roosevelt Would Ostracize Slacker: Says Conscientious ObjectorShould Be Sent to FiringLine
to Dg Trenches., N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1917, at 5; see also Chambers, supra note 3, at 32 (stating
Roosevelt "wanted such persons to be imprisoned, deported, or at least deprived of the right to vote").
73

74

Selective Draft Act, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78 (1917).

id.
7 5id.
76

KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 45.

77id
7s

Id. at 40.

79 Id. at 45.
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assigned to military camps, and military commanders used this opportunity (and
their power) to convince the objectors to serve militarily." Persecution, ostracism,
and physical violence-real and threatened-also led some conscientious objectors
to abandon their status, and was a constant fact of life for those who chose to
maintain their religious opposition to the war. 8
With the threat of a second world war on the horizon, the federal government
started its first peacetime draft in 1940.82 The Selective Training and Service Act of
1940 departed from its World War I counterpart by expanding conscientious
exemption eligibility from well-recognized religious sects to those whose objections
were based on "religious training and belief." 83 It also allowed conscientious objectors
to perform alternative service outside of the control of the military and under civilian
direction.84 Nobody raised the objection that these provisions might burden third
parties by potentially requiring the drafting of more men to replace those exempted
from service."
During World War II, the government drafted ten million men, of which over
50,000 of the drafted men identified as conscientious objectors." As in World War
I, conscientious objectors in World War II were often subject to maltreatment and
worse. 7 Nevertheless, the World War II experience for objectors proved to be far
better than in the previous war." The deployment of conscientious objectors for

s See Chambers, supra note 3, at 33.
s1 Some conscientious objectors who refused to follow orders from particularly brutal commanders
were "harangued, beaten with fists or rubber hoses, scrubbed down in cold showers with stiff brushes until
their skin was raw, kept in guardhouses or military prisons on diets of bread and water." Id. Ultimately,
eighty percent of the roughly 21,000 conscientious objectors who were drafted took up arms. Id.
S2 KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 46.
13 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889.
4 Id.
" This does not mean, however, that the changes were not otherwise controversial. The proposed
amendments triggered hearings in both the Senate and the House that lasted more than a month.
KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 65. Interest groups such as the Quaker Society of Friends, the Fellowship of
Reconciliation, and the American Civil Liberties Union testified on behalf of conscientious objectors. Id.
at 65-68. A number of high-ranking members of the military protested allowing conscientious objectors
to not serve in the military in some capacity. See id. at 65-70. For example, Amos A. Fries, "a retired
major general in the army. . . stated 'everyone should take the whole course in military training,"' and "[i]f
he does not want to shoulder a gun, pull the trigger of a machine gun, all right; but he should go to the
front the same as others." Id. at 66-67 (quoting CompulsoryiMilitaryTraining and Serice, Hearingon

S. 4164 Before the S. Comm. on MilitaryAffairs, 76th Cong. 305 (July 11, 1940) [hereinafter Hearing
on S. 4164] (statement of Amos A. Fries, Retired Major General, U.S. Army)). On the other side, one
speaker read a statement from a Quaker conference, asserting that requiring the conscientious objectors
to serve in noncombat military services would be "a negation of the right of conscience, and a denial of
religious freedom." Id. at 68 (quoting Hearingon S. 4164, supra at 165 (July 10, 1940) (statement of Paul
Comley French, Representative, Friends' General Conference)).
36 Chambers, supra note 3, at 37; see also KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 145.
s Many were forced to work on "Civilian Public Service Camps," and five thousand of these objectors
were sent to federal prison, either because they were secular objectors, were anti-war activists, or because
they refused to complete alternative service. Chambers, supranote 3, at 37-38.
ss See KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 5-7, 48-49, 145-46.
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alternative service also improved to the benefit of the country as well as the
objectors."
The World War II experience, however, did lead to an important subsequent
change in the draft laws. The wording of the conscientious objector provision in the
1940 Act was sufficiently ambiguous that a number of objectors who based their
opposition to war on non-religious grounds also applied for exemptions, leading to
significant litigation on the subject." Accordingly, an amendment to the provision
was enacted in 1948 that set forth that "[rieligious training and belief' meant "an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being" and not "essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code." 9
Significantly, at least one comment concerning third-party burdens was raised in
the debates leading up to this amendment. Senator Wayne Morse had reservations
about how broadly the exemption should sweep and made the following comments
in response to a conscientious objector who wrote to solicit advice on how to get
alternative work:
I was somewhat shocked that this young conscientious objector failed to
give any evidence in his letter that he recognized that from an ethical
standpoint he should not consider that he had any right to seek to serve
in a Government position on the ground that he was a conscientious
objector, when many ofhis own classmates already were on the battle lines
in Europe, and some of them had already made the supreme sacrifice.92
Morse's concern for third parties, however, was not echoed elsewhere in the
legislative debates.
The conscientious objector provision was amended in 1951 (again without any
comments concerning third party burdens) to accommodate those who objected to
all noncombatant service by permitting alternative nonmilitary service that
contributed "to the maintenance of ... health, safety, or interest as the local board
may deem appropriate . . . ."9 Other than that, the provision remained essentially

intact into the Vietnam War.9 4

8

See id. at 5-13, 145-48.

90 Russell, supra note 5, at 423-27. Some objectors' theory was that, although the provision required
that the objection to war had to be based on religious training and belief, it did not mean that the belief
itself had to be religious, thus ethical and philosophical reasons fell under the purview of the conscientious
objector exemption. Id. This statutory interpretation was recognized by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 706-08 (2d Cir. 1943) and rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Berman v.

United States, 156 F.2d 377, 380-82 (9th Cir. 1946).
9' Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(), 62 Stat. 604, 613 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 3806 (Supp. III 2016)).
92

Note, Pre-InductionAvailability of the Right to Clairn Conscientious Objector Exemption, 72

YALE LJ. 1459, 1464 n.31 (1963) (quoting 94 CONG. REC. 7277 (1948)).
93 Universal Military Training and Service Act, ch. 144, § l(q), 65 Stat. 75, 86 (1951) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3806 (Supp. III 2016)).
94 See Chambers, supra note 3, at 35, 38-43.
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During Vietnam, applications for conscientious objector status exploded." With
the increasing fatigue and anger over the war, those applying for conscientious
objector status expanded from those belonging to small religious sects to mainstream
religions such as Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism."6 Lawyers, clergymen,
nonprofits, and support groups created by the traditional pacifist faiths provided
resources for young men trying to avoid serving in the war. 7 Between 1965 and 1970,
170,000 registrants were classified as conscientious objectors, and by 1972, there
were more draft registrants classified as conscientious objectors than there were men
inducted into the army." Conscientious objection to war (or at least thatwar) had
now become mainstream.
C. JudicialDecisions
The Court first reviewed a constitutional challenge to the draft in Arver v United
States." Arverwas a multi-pronged attack questioning both the constitutionality of
the draft itself, as well as its application to conscientious objectors.' The opinion
addressed whether the military draft itselfwas constitutional.' 0 ' The Court ruled that
it was. 0 2 As the Court explained, "[T]he very conception of a just government and
its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render
military service in case of need."' 03
The Court then addressed the constitutionality of the conscientious exemption
provision of the draft, which, at that time, granted exemptions only to those who
belonged to specifically recognized pacifist churches.' 04 The statutory exemption was
potentially vulnerable on two counts.' 5 First, the religious objector who did not
qualify for the exemption could claim the draft violated his Free Exercise rights
because he was forced to serve against his religious beliefs while others were not.'
Second, he could claim the conscientious exemption provision constituted an
establishment of religion because it allowed only members of particular religious sects

9 Id. at 39-43.
96 Id. at 40.
97 i
9 Id. at 42.
99 245 U.S. 366 (1918). Arver is also commonly referred to as the Selective Draft Law Cases. See

Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 359 (1970) (Harlan,

J.,

concurring) (citing Arveras the Selective

DraftLaw Cases).
.oo See generally Selective Draf Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366.

101 Id.
12 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.

at 375-87.

at 387-90.
at 378.
at 375-76, 387-89; Selective Draft Act, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78 (1917) (exempting from

combatant military service members of "any well-recognized religious sect or organization ...
existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form").

105 See Selective Draf Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 389-90.
106 See iI.

whose
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to be eligible for exemption.o' The Court, however, took neither claim seriously and
summarily dismissed the First Amendment claims, stating only that:
we pass without anything but statement the proposition that an
establishment of a religion or an interference with the free exercise thereof
repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses
of the act to which we at the outset referred, because we think its
unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more.10
Notably, the Court did not buttress its defense of the provision by arguing that
expanding eligibility requirements would burden third parties drafted in place of the
exempted objectors-although the Court's summary statement obviously indicated
that it felt its conclusion did not require support of any kind.
Between the World Wars, the Court addressed the constitutionality of
mandatory military service requirement outside the draft context. The first of these
cases, United States v. Schwimmer, involved the construction of a provision of the
Naturalization Act of 1906 that required that applicants for citizenship declare under
oath that they would "support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United
States against all enemies."o' Schwimmer considered the denial of citizenship under
this Act to a 49-year-old woman (and widely known pacifist) who stated in response
to a question on her citizenship application that she "would not take up arms
personally" in defense of the country." 0 The Court upheld the denial."' Echoing
Arver, the Court stated that "the duty of citizens by force of arms to defend our
government against all enemies whenever necessity arises is a fundamental principle
of the Constitution."11 2 That the applicant herself was not subject to the draft at that
time because of her age and gender was of no matter.113
Naturalization was again at issue in the companion cases of United States v.
Macintosh114 and United States v. Bland.5s In Macintosh, a Yale divinity professor
was denied citizenship because he stated in his application that, although he would
take up arms to defend the United States in some wars, he would not do so if he
believed the war was not morally justified."' In Bland, a Canadian woman was
denied citizenship because she would only swear to defend the Constitution and laws
7
of the United States "as far as [her] conscience as a Christian [would] allow[,]""
meaning that although she would serve in a noncombatant role, she would not agree
107 See id.
108

Id.

109 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 646 (1929) (quoting Naturalization Act of 1906, ch.

3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596, 598 (repealed 1940)).
110 Id. at 646-47.

111 Id. at 653.
112

Id. at 650.

113

See id. at 650-51.

114

283 U.S. 605 (1931).

11' 283 U.S. 636 (1931).
116

117

Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 613, 617-19, 624-27; see also id at 628-29 (Hughes, CJ., dissenting).
Bland, 283 U.S. at 636-37.
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to bear arms."' The Court upheld the denials for the same reasons expressed in
Schwimmer-that the government can demand military service of its citizens." 9
Significantly, going beyond Scwhimmer, the Macintosh Court additionally
pronounced that conscientious objector exemptions were entirely matters of
legislative grace and not required under the Constitution.1 20
Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California brought the
conscientious-objector issue to the Court in a different context.121 In Hamilton,
students at UCLA were suspended for refusing to take mandatory military science
and training courses, as was then required in the University of California system.1 22
They appealed their suspensions claiming that taking the military courses conflicted
with their religious principles.1 23 The Court ruled for the Regents, relying on the
precept that "every citizen owe[d] [a] reciprocal duty . . . to . . . defend [the]

government against [its] enemies."124
The Court offered a similar rationale and came to a similar result in In re
Summers, a case that was litigated during the Second World War. 251In Summers,
an applicant to the Illinois bar asserted that, for religious reasons, he could not take
an oath to uphold the Illinois Constitution because it had a provision that required
him to serve in the militia in time of war.1 26 The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that
his inability to take the oath disqualified him from admission, and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed, citing Hamilton.127 According to the Court, the
"[Hamilton] decision as to the powers of the state government over military training
8
is applicable to the power of Illinois to require military service from her citizens."1 2
The string of conscientious objectors losing before the Supreme Court was finally
broken in 1946 in Girouardv. United States.129 In Girouard, an applicant for
naturalization stated in his application that because of his religious beliefs, he could
not serve in the military as a combatant but was willing to perform alternative service
as a non-combatant. 30 Overruling Schwimer, Macintosh, and Bland, the Court
held, as a matter of statutory construction, that the Naturalization Act of 1906 did
not require applicants to take an oath that they would bear arms in the nation's

..
s See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 63 (1946) (construing the facts of Bland in this
manner).
"9

Bland, 283 U.S. at 637.

Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 623 ("The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear
arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only because, it has
accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him.").
120

121
122
123
124

125
126
127

Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 257.
See id. at 262-63, 265.
In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
Id. at 562-64.
Id. at 562, 572-73.

121 Id. at 572.
129 328 U.S. 61
130

Id. at 61-62.

(1946).
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defense, as those cases had held.' 3 ' It therefore ruled that Girouard's citizenship
application should be granted.' 32 Importantly for our purposes, the Court went on to
commend the values of noncombatant (alternative) service and equate the
contributions of noncombatants with that of the military.'33 As the Court stated:
The bearing of arms, important as it is, is not the only way in which our

institutions may be supported and defended, even in times of great peril.
Total war in its modern form dramatizes as never before the great
cooperative effort necessary for victory. The nuclear physicists who
developed the atomic bomb, the worker at his lathe, the seaman on cargo
vessels, construction battalions, nurses, engineers, litter bearers, doctors,
chaplains-these, too, made essential contributions. And many of them
made the supreme sacrifice. . . . The effort of war is indivisible; and those
whose religious scruples prevent them from killing are no less patriots than
those whose special traits or handicaps result in their assignment to duties
far behind the fighting front. Each is making the utmost contribution
according to his capacity. The fact that his role may be limited by religious
convictions rather than by physical characteristics has no necessary bearing
on his attachment to his country or on his willingness to support and
defend it to his utmost.

134

Because none involved draft cases, the decisions from Schwimmer through
Girouarddid not provide a direct opportunity for the Court to discuss the thirdparty burden issue. The Court, perhaps, could have used the cases rejecting the claim
that there was a constitutional right to conscientious objection as an opportunity to
include protecting the interests of third parties as another justification for this
conclusion.1 35 Nevertheless, given the weight the Court assigned to its central
argument that having to defend the country was a reciprocal obligation of
citizenship, 36 it certainly had no need to advance this position.
Girouardprobablycame the closest to dealing with the burden issue. The Court's
allusion in the passage quoted above to the "supreme sacrifice" that noncombatants
may make in defense of their country could be understood as suggesting that the
burden of risking one's life is not always passed from the objector to the third party
7
that serves in his place because the conscientious objector could still bear that risk.1 3
Yet, if that was the Court's point, it was not clearly made, particularly since the

'31

Id. at 69-70.

132 Id. at 70.
133 See infra notes 195-199 and accompanying text (discussing whether the burden imposed on
objectors by alternative service equate to the burdens placed on third parties who are drafted in their place).
14 Girouard, 328 U.S. at 64-65.
135 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
136 See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 650 (1929) ("[T]he very conception of a just

government and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military
service in case of need." (quoting Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918)).
137 See supra text accompanying note
134.
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'

Court's "supreme sacrifice" language refers to all noncombatants and not just
conscientious objectors engaged in alternative service.' 38
The opportunity for the Court to address the question of the third-party burdens,
however, did arise in three major cases that arose during the Vietnam War. As noted
earlier, applications for conscientious objector exemptions rose exponentially during
Vietnam.' 39 Because the war was hugely unpopular, many draft age men were
exploring as many options as they could to avoid conscription.' 40 Conscientious
objection was one of the avenues available. Further, unlike in previous eras, many
potential applicants were not deterred from seeking the exemption because the
unpopularity of the war meant that conscientious objector status had lost much of its
social stigma.' 4
The first of these cases was United States v. Seeger.'42 Seeger addressed the
constitutionality of § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act.' 43
Section 6(j) then provided as follows:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to
be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the
United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious
training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological,
or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.' 44
Daniel Seeger asserted that his objection to war was religious in nature, but was
not theistic, meaning it was not based on a belief in "relation to a Supreme Being,"
as required in the statute.' 45 He contended that granting exemptions to those with
theistic beliefs, while excluding his beliefs from eligibility, violated both the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses.' 46 The Seeger Court construed § 6(j) broadly
in order to avoid the constitutional questions.14 7 Holding that § 6(j)'s eligibility

138 See Girouard,328 U.S. at 64. Girouardsvibrant defense of conscientious objectors against attacks
on their patriotism and their willingness to do their fair share, however, might indicate that the Court was
beginning to be concerned with countering the impression that conscientious objectors were receiving
benefits at the expense of others.
139 See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying
text.
140 See Chambers, supra note 3, at 39-40.
141 Seeid.

380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Id. at 164-165.
144 Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 612-13 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. § 3806 (Supp. III 2016)). The 1951 amendments to the Selective Service Act of 1948 changed
142
143

the name of the Act to the Universal Military Training and Service Act. Universal Military Training and

Service Act, ch. 144, § 1(a), 65 Stat. 75, 75 (1951).
145 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166-67.
146
147

See id. at 165.
See id. at 173-86.
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requirements extended to non-theistic beliefs of the kind held by Seeger, the Court
stated:
We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression "Supreme
Being" rather than the designation "God," was merely clarifying the
meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions and
to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views. We
believe that under this construction, the test of belief "in a relation to a
Supreme Being" is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful
occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.
Where such beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of their respective
holders we cannot say that one is "in a relation to a Supreme Being" and
the other is not. 148
In Welsh v. United States, the Court interpreted § 6(j) even more broadly.'49 In
Welsh, the objector struck out the word religion in his application for conscientiousobjector status and instead explained that his objection to war had "been formed 'by
reading in the fields of history and sociology.""50 A plurality found him eligible for
conscientious-objector status nevertheless."' According to the plurality, § 6(j)
excluded only those objectors "whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose
objection to war does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but
instead rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency."1 52 It
did not exclude applicants such as Welsh "whose consciences, spurred by deeply held
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed
themselves to become a part of an instrument of war."1 53 In short, as explained in
Justice Harlan's concurrence, the plurality construed § 6(j)'s "religious training and
belief' requirement to include beliefs that were "purely ethicalormoralin source and
content" despite the explicit language in the statute to the contrary.154
The third-party burden argument was potentially pertinent to the issues raised in
Seeger and Welsh in two ways, one favorable to the government and one supporting
the objectors. On the government's side was the fact that the expansion in
conscientious-objector eligibility to include non-theistic and non-religious objectors

14

Id. at 165-66.

149 SeeWelsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340-44 (1970). In response to

Seeger, Congress by this
time had amended § 6() so as to not include the requirement that the objector's beliefs were in relation
to a Supreme Being. See Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 1(7), 81 Stat. 100,
104. It had, however, left the language that eligibility excluded beliefs based "essentially [on] political,
sociological, or philosophical views, or [on] a merely personal moral code" fully intact. Id.
..o Welsb, 398 U.S. at 341 (internal citation omitted).
'.' Id. at 343-44. Justice Harlan concurred in the result on grounds that he believed that § 6()'s
distinction between religious and non-religious beliefs was unconstitutional. Id. at 356, 367 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
152 Id. at 342-43 (plurality opinion).
13 Id. at 344.
14 Id. at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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sought in Seegerand Welsh would presumably increase, and in fact did increase, the
number of persons granted conscientious objectors status.' Accordingly, the
government could have raised the argument that the expansion Seeger and Welsh
sought would require persons who would otherwise not have been drafted to now be
conscripted. This argument, however, was not presented by the government, and was
not mentioned in any of the Justices' opinions, including the concurrences and
dissents.
On the other side, Seeger and Welsh could have supported their arguments that
the limits in § 6(j) were unconstitutional on grounds that limiting conscientiousobjector eligibility to those with theistic or religious beliefs meant that persons
drafted as substitutes for those exempted were burdened solely because of another's
religiousbeliefs. This argument too was not raised and not mentioned in any of the
Justices' opinions.
The Vietnam War era case that could have most starkly presented the third-party
burden problem was Gillette v. United States.'"' In Gillette, the petitioners Guy
Gillette and Louis Negre challenged the requirement that limited conscientiousexemption eligibility to those who oppose "participation in war in any form." 5 7 The
petitioners objected to "unjust wars," but not all wars, on conscientious grounds and,
on that basis, were denied conscientious-objector status.' They therefore sought to
expand conscientious objector-eligibility to include those who objected to unjust
wars as well as those who objected to all wars.1s' The petitioners presented two First
Amendment arguments in support of their claim.' 60 First, they alleged that
government refusal to grant them conscientious-objector status violated their Free
Exercise rights by forcing them to participate in a war they conscientiously
opposed.'6 ' Second, they contended that the government's distinguishing between
those who opposed all wars on religious grounds and those who opposed unjust wars
violated the Establishment Clause by creating a "religious gerrymander[]" that
impermissibly discriminated among religions. 6 2 The Court rejected both the Free
63
Exercise and the Establishment claims.1
As a practical matter, the result in Gillette is not surprising. The religious
objection to unjust wars is a far-more-common tenet among religions than is the

155

16

See Chambers, supra note 3, at 42.

401 U.S. 437 (1971).

Id at 438-41. The specific provision challenged in Gillette was § 6() of the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967: "Nothing contained in this title ... shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of
religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Id. at 441
157

(quoting 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1964 & Supp. V 1970)).
..s See id at 439 (noting that Gillette based his objection to unjust wars on his humanist beliefs); id
at 440-41 (noting that Negre based his objection on his Catholic beliefs).
159 See id. at 439-41.
160
161

See id at 448-52.
See id at 448.

162 See id. at 451-52.
163

See id. at 463.
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objection to all war; and, for example, is a part of Catholic doctrine.'64 Expanding
conscientious-exemption eligibility to those opposing unjust wars would therefore
have significantly increased the number of persons eligible for conscientious-objector
status.165
Accordingly, the Court referenced "the Government's need for manpower[]" in
setting forth why limiting conscientious-objector exemptions to those who objected
to all wars was permissible.' 6 6 Notably, however, the Court relied more heavily on
two other grounds. First, it cited the government's interest in fairness, stating that
"[w]hen the Government exacts so much, the importance of fair, evenhanded, and
uniform decisionmaking is obviously intensified."' 67 Yet, the Court continued,
"[T]he claim to relief on account of ...
[objection to unjust wars] is intrinsically a
claim of uncertain dimensions, and that granting the claim in theory would involve
a real danger of erratic or even discriminatory decision-making in administrative
practice."116
Second, and relatedly, the Court relied on the effects that any perceived
unfairness in administration might have on public morale.' 6 ' As the Court stated,
"Should it be thought that those who go to war are chosen unfairly or capriciously,
then a mood of bitterness and cynicism might corrode the spirit of public service and
the values of willing performance of a citizen's duties that are the very heart of free
government."'70

164 Id. at 470 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting the doctrines of the Catholic Church
instruct that "a
person has a moral duty to take part in wars declared by his government so long as they comply with the
tests of his church for just wars[,]" but also "a moral duty not to participate in unjust wars" (citing
Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity,
and Liberty, Pacem in Teris ¶¶ 46, 50-51 (Apr. 11, 1963), http://w2.vatican.va/content/johnxxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hfj-xxiii-enc_11041963_pacem.html [perma.cc/HSF9-LTF8])).
165 The fact that Seegerand Welch had already expanded the religious training and belief requirement
to include non-theistic objections, of course, only further added to the numbers of persons who would
have been able to seek conscientious-objector status based on their objection to unjust wars.

166
167
16s

Gillette, 401 U.S. at 454-55.
Id. at 455.

Id. The Court further explained why the task of administratively sorting objections to unjust wars

would be so difficult:
A virtually limitless variety of beliefs are subsumable under the rubric, "objection to a particular
war." All the factors that might go into nonconscientious dissent from policy, also might appear
as the concrete basis of an objection that has roots as well in conscience and religion. Indeed,
over the realm of possible situations, opposition to a particular war may more likely be political
and nonconscientious, than otherwise. The difficulties of sorting the two, with a sure hand, are
considerable. Moreover, the belief that a particular war at a particular time is unjust is by its
nature changeable and subject to nullification by changing events. Since objection may fasten
on any of an enormous number of variables, the claim is ultimately subjective, depending on
the claimant's view of the facts in relation to his judgment that a given factor or congeries of
factors colors the character of the war as a whole.

Id. at 455-56 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
169 See id. at 460.
170id
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What the Gillette Court did not mention, however, was any specific concern
with the persons who would have to serve in place of the exempted objectors. Even
more remarkably, the government did not raise this point in its brief opposing
broadening the exemption.' 7 ' To be sure, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold alluded
to third-party harms in his argument for the United States.1 72 In presenting the
government's justifications for not exempting those who objected to unjust wars,
Griswold stated:
One of the problems about a conscientious objector system is to
administer it fairly, fairly to those who go as well as to those who are
allowed to engage in alternative service. It needs to be remembered that
for every Conscientious Objector, for every Conscientious Objector there
is a man called to serve who would not otherwise be called. He isn't here,
he isn't before us but in every case, it is a choice between this man and
some other man.'
Even here, however, Griswold's central point appears to be that the third-party
concern was the potential unfairness in the administration of the conscientiousobjector system that could result if the exemption was extended to objectors to unjust
wars.1 74 He did not argue in this passage (or in any part of his oral argument) that
the existence of the conscientious-objector exemption itself imposed problematic
7
burdens on the third parties who must serve instead of those excused.1
Given the context of the times, that omission is stark. When Gillettewas decided
in 1971, the Vietnam War was at such a point that the argument that expanded
conscientious-objector exemption eligibility would require significantly more third
parties to be drafted should have been obvious. Although draftees only accounted for
sixteen percent of the U.S. military, they comprised a substantial majority of the
infantry riflemen in Vietnam.' 7 ' Even more significantly, almost half of the battle
deaths were draftees.' 7 7 In addition, the unpopularity of the Vietnam War had
already led to unprecedented numbers of persons applying for conscientious-objector
status, '7 so that the effects on manpower in excusing objectors from military service
must have been apparent. For example, in 1969, the year before Gillette was argued,
the ratio between conscientious exemptions and actual inductions was as high as

171 See Brief for the United States, Gillette, 401 U.S. 437 (Nos. 85, 325), 1970 WL 136426.
172

See

Oral

Argument

at

45:56,

Gillette,

401 U.S. 437

(No.

85),

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/85 [https://perma.cc/BVL3-2LRQ].
173 id.
174 See id. at 44:35 ("Indeed my principal concern about this case, is that if the exemption is pushed
to unintended and impractical lengths it may jeopardize the whole concept of the exemption, which has
in fact worked rather remarkably well over a period of close to 200 years.").

17"See generally Oral Argument, Gillette, 401 U.S. 437 (No. 85).
176 See Chambers, supra note 3, at 39-40 (stating that in 1969, eighty-eight of infantry riflemen in
Vietnam were draftees).

17s Id. at 40-41.
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13.45.1' In 1970, the year Gillette was argued, this ratio increased to 25.55; and
when the case was decided in 1971, it had grown to 42.62.180 (To put this into
perspective, consider that the ratio of conscientious objectors to actual inductions
was only .14 in World War I and .15 in World War 11.181)
Further, as explained above, if Gillette had been decided in favor of the
petitioners, the number of qualified objectors would have increased even more,
because eligibility would then include the class of persons who opposed unjust
wars. 8 2 Given the Vietnam War's unpopularity, such a holding would have opened
the floodgates for those seeking conscientious exemptions even wider. That many
more persons (third parties) would need to be drafted to meet the military's
manpower demands, if Gillette was decided otherwise, was a virtual certainty.
In addition, because the mechanisms for the draft had changed to a lottery
system, the effects of increasing the number of conscientious objectors on third
parties would be more easily traceable.' 83 Under the lottery system, draft eligible men
were assigned a draft number, and those numbers were called seriatim in order to
meet manpower demands.18 4 Thus, for example, if the pool of men with the assigned
numbers 1-194 was exhausted, the draft would proceed to those with the number
195, then 196, and so on until the government's manpower needs were satisfied.'
Accordingly, if the pool of draftees with numbers 1-194 would have originally been
sufficient to satisfy the government's manpower needs, but was instead depleted by
persons opting for conscientious-objector status, the draft would need to conscript
those with the number 195 (and beyond) in order to make up for the deficit. Having
to draft those with the number 195 then would directly result from expanded
conscientious-objector eligibility. As a result, the third parties conscripted to replace
the exempted conscientious objectors could effectively be identified by their birth
date.
Given the palpable effect that a win for the Gillette petitioners would have had
on identifiable third parties, then, the fact that neither the Court nor the United
States relied on this point (other than perhaps briefly at oral argument'"') in defense
of the Act is telling. Gillette thus stands as the crowning touch to a long and
consistent historical record in which concerns for third-party burdens have had little
or no resonance in the exemption debate. The dog had not barked.

17 Id. at 42.
'

30

's'
132
183
184

id.
Id.
See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
See Exec. Order No. 11,497, 34 Fed. Reg. 19,019 (Nov. 29, 1969).
C

In the first year of the lottery, the highest number called was actually 195. The Vietnam Lotenes,
SELECTIVE SERV. Sys., https://www.sss.gov/About/History-And-Records/lotterl [https://perma.cc/6N3JZHLB] (last visited May 15, 2018).
16 See supra notes 172-175 and accompanying
text.
'
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II. POSSIBLE REASONS EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF THIRD-PARTY BURDENS
FROM THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR EXEMPTION DEBATE

As noted at the outset of this Article, conscientious-objection exemptions present
the religious exemption/third-party burden issue in its starkest form, because the
stakes on both sides are so high.'81 7 Why then, have the effects of conscientious
objector exemptions on third parties received such little attention in the broader
debates and litigation surrounding conscientious objection to war? This Section
explores two possible reasons. Part A responds to, and rejects, a potential,
preliminary objection-that the conclusions of the previous section are in error and
the record does evidence a concern for third party burdens. Part B addresses the
possible contention that the third parties who must serve in place of conscientious
objections are not actually 'burdened'-at least as third-party burden is understood
in the literature.

A. The DogDid Bark?
An initial response to the conclusion that there was little or no concern with
third-party burdens in the conscientious-objector debates might be that this
assertion is factually wrong, and the historical and judicial records reflect third-party
concerns. First, it might be asserted that concerns for third-party burdens were
evidenced in the argument that it would be unfair to those compelled to serve
(third parties) when conscientious objectors were exempted.'"' The argument
runs something like this: The cognizable third-party burden created by
conscientious-objector exemptions is not only one in which the third party is
compelled to serve becausethe objector has been excused, there is also a cognizable
burden imposed on the third party because he is being subjected to disparate
treatment-he must serve even though the objector is excused. This argument,
essentially, is the fairness argument that arose from time to time in the conscientiousobjection debates and the argument that Solicitor General Griswold presented in
Gillette.8 9
The disparate treatment argument is powerful, and there are some writers,
including myself, who have argued that disparate treatment can raise serious
constitutional concerns when it prefers religious over comparable secular beliefs.'o
See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42, 167-170 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 42, 46-48, 172-175 and accompanying text.
190 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
ConstitutionalBasis for ProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1248 (1994) (arguing
that protecting religious belief but not comparable non-religious belief violates constitutional principles
of equality of conscience); see also William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise
Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 322 (1991) (contending that protecting religious belief but not
comparable non-religious belief is inconsistent with the First Amendment's commitment to the equality
137

133

of ideas); Micah Schwartzman, WhatlfRehgion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1353 (2012)
(asserting that religion cannot be meaningfully distinguished from nonreligion).
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The problem raised by disparate treatment, however, is not properly understood as
one of third-party burdens. For example, if unequal treatment alone imposed a
burden, then Hobby Lobby's competitors would be 'burdened' because they would
still have to provide contraceptive coverage while Hobby Lobby was exempted.
Similarly, Gregory Holt's fellow prisoners would be 'burdened' because they were
denied the right to grow a beard while Holt was not. The disparate treatment claim,
in short, would turn every religious exemption into a third-party burden issue. There
would be no limiting principle.'
A second way in which the third-party burden may be thought to have been
addressed in the conscientious-objector debates is with respect to the conditions that
have, at times, been imposed upon those seeking exemptions, such as requiring the
objector pay commutation fees, furnish a substitute, and/or perform alternative
service.' 92 Specifically, it might be contended that such conditions are exacted as
compensation for the burdens imposed upon third parties.
This claim, as well, misses the mark. To begin with, one of the
conditions-commutation fees-has no particular relationship to third-party
burdens. Even if the objector pays the fee, the third party still must serve.
The option of having the third party furnish a substitute initially appears to be
more promising. After all, if the conscientious objector furnishes a substitute, there
would be no need to draft the third party in his place because the substitute would
have assumed that role. On closer examination, however, the substitute option
cannot be explained as an effort to lessen the burdens on third parties. First, as an
historical matter, there does not seem to be any evidence that the substitution option
was adopted for this reason, nor is there any indication that the abandonment of this
option during the Civil War raised any third-party burden concerns.' 93 Second, while
the furnishing of substitutes was a popular choice by non-pacifists seeking to avoid
the draft (during the period in the Civil War when this option was generally to
nonreligious applicants), it was not attractive to many pacifists because their religious
scruples often forbade sending others into war.' 94 It, thus, did not address the issue
of third parties drafted in place of objectors. Third, the option was just that-an
option. It was never a requirement. It would, therefore, have been extraordinarily
under-inclusive if its purpose were to prevent third parties from being drafted in place
of religious objectors.
A more interesting question arises in the context of alternative service. As
discussed previously, the Girouardopinion provided a full-throated defense of the
values of alternative service, including noting that many noncombatants were also
killed in service to their country.'s The opinion, then, might be interpreted as
suggesting that conscientious objectors engaged in alternative service do not pass

'91

See, e.g., Tebbe et al., supra note 10, at 6.

192 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing alternative measures to military service

that were available during the colonial period).
'13 See KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 32-38.
194 See id.; see also supra note 38.
195 See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 64 (1946).
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their burdens on to those who serve in their place. Noncombatants as well as
combatants incur the burdens of war. As Girouardstates, "The effort of war is
indivisible . . . . "196
Girouardis certainly correct in recognizing that noncombatants generally, and
conscientious-objector noncombatants specifically, have contributed enormously to
war efforts, often at considerable sacrifice to themselves.' 9 7 Many have served
heroically, including Desmond Doss, who was awarded the Congressional Medal of
Honor for his actions as a combat medic in World War II.1' Nevertheless, it would
be inaccurate to equate the burdens of alternative service with those of military
combatant service. To begin with, there are not many roles for noncombatants on
the front lines. In addition, current law allows alternative service requirements to be
satisfied outside the context of the military service altogether, meaning that some
objectors will not face the dangers of even noncombatant military service. 99
Accordingly, although there are exceptions, it cannot be fairly stated that the risks
incurred in alternative service approach the risks incurred in combatant service.
There is still a more compelling reason, however, why the burdens of combatant
service cannot be equated with those of alternative service. Alternative service does
not impose upon the objector the burden of having to take the life of another. That
burden falls solely on those who are required to bear arms.
To be sure, requirements such as commutation fees, substitutes, and alternative
service may have value in addressing some of the other concerns associated with
conscientious objection, including assuring those exempted do not get off scot-free.
They cannot, however, be traced to alleviating the burdens that exemptions impose
on third parties.
B. Do Conscientious ObjectorExemptions Create Third-PartyBurdens?
Another possible response why the debates surrounding conscientious objection
did not raise the third-party concern is that conscientious exemptions arguably do
not actually shift "meaningful burdens to identifiable third parties," as the third-party
burden inquiry requires. 200 This point may be articulated in three ways. The first is
196

d

19' See id at 64-65.

198 Doss, Desmond T, CONG. MEDAL HONOR Soc'Y, http://www.cmohs.org/recipientdetail/2717/doss-desmond-t.php [https://perma.cc/9Y8Y-BAJ8] (last visited May 15, 2018); see also
HACKSAw RIDGE (Cross Creek Pictures et al. 2016) (portraying Doss).
199 See 50 U.S.C. § 3806(j) (Supp. III 2016) ("Any person claiming exemption from combatant
training and service because of such conscientious objections whose claim is sustained by the local board
shall, if he is inducted into the armed forces under this chapter, be assigned to noncombatant service as
defined by the President, or shall, if he is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such
noncombatant service, in lieu of such induction, be ordered by his local board, subject to such regulations
as the President may prescribe, to perform for a period [of up to twenty-four months] . . . such civilian
work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest as the Director may deem
appropriate .... ).
200 See Tebbe et al., supra note 10, at 2,4 (setting forth the Constitutional standard for mediating
between religious freedom and the public good).
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that exempting the objector does not shift burdens because the objector,
conceptually, was never actually available for service. As Kent Greenawalt argues,
someone who has deep opposition to war is conceptually similar to someone who
does not have the physical capability to serve because of "his feelings about fighting
[mean that] he cannot serve in some crucial sense . . . ."201 Seen in this light, the
objector is not someone who is excused from service, he is someone who is disabled
from service. The third party then does not take the place of the objector in military
service, because the objector could never have been in military service in the first
place. 20 2 Accordingly, the third party is not actually burdened by the conscientious
objector's exemption.
A second and overlapping contention is that even if the objector is available for
military service in a theoretical sense, he may not be available as a practical matter.
The depth of conscientious objection to war runs deep. Since the time of Maximilian
of Numidia, some objectors have died for their beliefs rather than agreeing to kill
others. 203 Others have gone to jail or endured extensive persecution. 204 The historical
record, in short, is replete with examples in which objectors did not take up arms
even when required by law to do so. Exempting the objector, therefore, may have no
practical effects on third parties because the objector would not have served anyway.
As Greenawalt explains, "In a symbolic sense, a burden is shifted from those who
205
avoid conscription to those who submit. The practical effect is more doubtful."
The third contention supporting the claim that conscientious-objector
exemptions do not impose burdens on third parties is that the effects of the drafts
are too diffuse to be meaningful or identifiable. 206 As Frederick Gedicks and Rebecca
Van Tassell explain, the exemption is not cognizable because it creates only "a slight,
marginal increase in the large preexisting risk of being drafted." 207 Unlike the
employees of Hobby Lobby who are denied contraceptive coverage as a direct result
of the company's exemption from the Affordable Care Act,208 the relationship of the
201 KENT GREENAWALT, Conscientious Objection to MiilitaryService, in 1 RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION: FAIRNESS AND FREE EXERCISE 49, 52 (2006).
202 Justice Marshall struck a similar theme in Gillette when he referenced "the hopelessness
of
converting a sincere conscientious objector into an effective fighting man." See Gillette v. United States,

401 U.S. 437, 452-53 (1971) (citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 369 (1970) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
203 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
204 See Chambers, supra note 3, at 25-27.
205 GREENAWALT, supra note 201,
at 53.
206 See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 10, at 363-64.
207 Seeid. at 367. Although Gedicks and Van Tassell recognize that an "exemption from the draft for
religious pacifists increases the mathematical likelihood that nonpacifists and secular pacifists will be
drafted in their place," they assert that "[t]he risk of being drafted already exists and is already substantial
... [so that any] additional burden imposed by accommodating religious pacifists ... is barely measurable."
Id. at 363-64 (footnote omitted).
20

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("In

the Court's view, RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit corporation's religious beliefs no matter
the impact that accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the corporation owners'
religious faith-in these cases, thousands of women employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or
dependents of persons those corporations employ.").
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conscientious objector to the third party drafted in his place is simply too attenuated
to form a causal connection.209
The arguments that third parties are not burdened by exempting objectors have
force, but they are not conclusive. To begin with, not all objectors are either
theoretically or practically unavailable. Some objectors serve if compelled to do so,
despite their religious beliefs, meaning that exempting them does affect third
parties. 210 Moreover, even if some objectors are theoretically or practically
unavailable, this would not explain the absence of the discussion of third-party
burdens in the legislative and judicial debates.
Similarly, the diffusion argument is also not persuasive in the context of
consciousness objectors to war. Because the numbers of objectors were relatively
small in World Wars I and II,211 it may be that it would have been difficult to trace
the impact of exemptions on the numbers or the identities of persons drafted in place
of conscientious objectors. Nevertheless, it is not immediately clear why this should
make a difference. As long as it could be determined that some thirdpartieshad to
be conscripted in order to make up for those exempted, the conclusion that
conscientious-objection
exemptions caused third-party harms would be
established. 212 Further, despite what some have argued, the burden on drafted third
parties is not the same as the financial burden employers face when forced to cover
the cost of unemployment-compensation requirements for exempted persons. 213 In
that instance, the harm is correctly described as "infinitesimal." 214 The burden
imposed on the third party drafted in place of the objector, in contrast, is palpable
and severe.
Second, even if the causal link between those exempted and those drafted was
attenuated in the earlier years of the federal draft, it was not during Vietnam. 215 As
discussed earlier, the sheer numbers of persons seeking exemptions made it clear that
additional third parties would need to be drafted to cover manpower needs, and the
mechanics of the lottery system made it possible to identify the third parties who
needed to be added to the draft by their birthdates. 216 One would think that the
third-party burden issue would have been raised in Gillette given that its relevance
was so obvious.

209 See Lund, supra note 10, at 1378 ("The likelihood of you being drafted because someone else got
an exemption is infinitesimal; it is barely more than the risk you had originally of being drafted.").
210 For example, during World War I, eighty percent of the roughly 21,000 registered
conscientious
objectors who were drafted ended up fighting in combat. Chambers, supra note 3, at 33.
211 See supra notes 76-78, 86 and accompanying
text.
212 C Esbeck, supranote 14, at 376 (noting that third parties need to be drafted to
replace objectors
who are excused).
213 See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 10,
at 364.
214 Lund, supra note 10, at 1378.
215 See supra notes 76-78, 86, 95-98, 209 and accompanying
text.
216 See supra notes 95-98, 176-185 and accompanying
text.
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ABSENCE OF REFERENCES TO THIRD-PARTY
HARMS IN THE DEBATES SURROUNDING CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

The argument that religious exemptions may violate the Establishment Clause
because of the burdens they impose on third parties stems from the Court's decision
in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 217 In that case, the Court ruled that a state
statute granting employees an absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath
was unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause because it did not take into
account the burden that requirement would impose on the employee's employer or
co-workers. 218 The argument surfaced again in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
based on the contention that exempting Hobby Lobby under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act from having to provide contraceptive coverage to its employees
improperly imposed a third-party burden on those employees. 219 The Court rejected
that argument in a footnote, although it acknowledged that RFRA "must take
adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on
nonbeneficiaries."220
At present, the vitality and scope of the third-party burden argument is not clear.
Applying a third-party burden analysis to conscientious-objector exemptions may
therefore be useful in both testing the validity of the third-party claim as well as
appraising the constitutionality of the conscientious-objector exemption itself.
Christopher Lund offers an appropriate starting place from which to begin this
inquiry. 221 He suggests that in evaluating the constitutionality of the exemptions that
impose burdens on third parties, one should examine four factors: the burden
imposed on third parties, the likelihood of the burden affecting third parties, the
depth of the religious interest at stake, and the existence of secular exemptions in the
applicable statute that might make the granting of a religious exemption more
understandable .222
The first of these factors strongly militates against the constitutionality of the
conscientious-objector exemption. 223 There is, after all, probably no greater burden
that could be imposed on a third party than that created by forcing him into
combatant military service. The second factor, the likelihood of harm, is contestable,
although it also seems to cut in this direction, particularly after Vietnam. 224 As
discussed previously, simple logic indicates that if some people are excused from

472 U.S. 703 (1985).
Id. at 709-10.
219 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780-82
(2014); see also id. at 2787,
2790 2799-2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 2781 n.37 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720
(2005)). In HobbyLobby itself,
217
211

the Court ruled that Hobby Lobby's employees were not sufficiently burdened because they could get
contraceptive coverage directly from the government. Id. at 2781-82, 2781 n.37.
221 See Lund, supra note 10, at 1376-81.
222 Id.
223 See id. at 1377-78.
224 See id. at 1378-79.
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service, others will have to serve in their place.225 Further, the use of the draft lottery
during Vietnam made the causal connection even more direct. 226 The fourth factor
also weighs in favor of unconstitutionality, 227 as the conscientious objector exemption
only applies to religious objectors (depending, as will be discussed below, on how one
construes Seegerand Welsh). 228
In contrast, the third factor-the strength and importance of the religious
interest protected-is the only factor counselling in favor of the exemption's
constitutionality. 2 29 To be sure, this factor weighs heavily, as conscientious objection
to war raises that interest to the highest level. But it is not clear that interest would,
23 0
or should, outweigh the burdens imposed on third parties.
Under this analysis, then, there is a high likelihood that conscientious-objector
23
exemptions would not survive a third-party burden Establishment Clause attack. 1
The question then becomes what inferences can be drawn from this conclusion.
Three are possible. The first is that the third-party burden claim must be
misguided. As we have seen, conscientious-objector exemptions have been a part of
the nation's history since the colonies and were included in every draft imposed by
the federal government. 23 2 Further, although conscientious-objector provisions have
been highly controversial on other grounds, the argument that they are improper
because they impose third-party burdens has never achieved resonance. It would
therefore be rather startling to now conclude that conscientious-objector exemptions
are unconstitutional.
Yet, if conscientious-objector exemptions are constitutional, the third-party
burden argument becomes suspect since the third-party burden is so clear and severe.
The broad implication, then, is that there is no Establishment Clause barrier on
religious exemptions imposing burdens on third parties, even when those burdens

See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 184-185 and accompanying text.
227 See Lund, supra note 10, at
1381.
221 See infra notes 241-242 and accompanying
text.
229 See Lund, supra note 10, at 1379-80.
230 Whether protecting the religious objector's interest outweighs the burden on the
third party may
actually be beside the point. Under existing doctrine, the weighing of interests is not normally a part of
Establishment Clause analysis. A government action that offends anti-establishment norms is
unconstitutional, even if supported by a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of the City of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397-98 (1985) (striking down a program providing aid to religious schools
without inquiring whether the program served a compelling state interest). Butsee, e.g., Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1982) (applying the compelling interest test to a statute that purportedly
discriminated among religious sects).
231 An argument perhaps could be raised that a conscientious-objector exemption is constitutional
because it simply lifts a burden (military service) imposed by the state. Cf Corp. of the Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987). The burdenlifting argument, however, is not pertinent to instances when lifting the burden of the religious objector
imposes a burden on the third party. As Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman, and Richard Schragger note,
"Nothing about the distinction between lifting and imposing regulatory burdens tracks the deeper concern
with situations in which the government requires private citizens to bear the consequences of
accommodating the religious beliefs of other private citizens." Tebbe et al., supra note 10, at 10.
232 See supra Section
I.B.
225

226
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are substantial. 233 To be sure, avoiding a third-party burden maybe a justification to
deny a Free Exercise or RFRA claim to a religious claimant seeking an exemption.
(Thus, the concern with third-party burdens could offer another reason why, for
example, there is no constitutional right to a conscientious objector exemption.234)
But once the government has granted an exemption, that provision would not be
vulnerable on Establishment grounds, irrespective of the burden imposed. If cases
like Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. are correct, therefore, their rationale must
rest on other grounds. 235
The second possible inference assumes the reverse; that is to say that the history
and litigation surrounding conscientious objection have simply missed the thirdparty burdens argument, and conscientious-objector exemptions are unconstitutional
because of the burdens they impose. No doubt, this would be a jarring decision given
the deep-rootedness of the conscientious-objector exemptions in the culture. It
would also be unsettling in that it would again place conscientious objectors outside
the law, and perhaps again lead the government to test the strength and commitment
of those opposed to war. The conclusion, however, may not be completely outside
the bounds. The Court decided Estate of Thornton v. Caldor in 1985,236 some
fourteen years after the Court last addressed conscientious objector issues in
Gillette,237 so it is possible that the third-party-burden argument had not yet
crystallized when the Court was deciding the earlier conscientious-exemption cases.
Nevertheless, the absence of references to third-party argument in the history
surrounding conscientious objection still cuts seriously against the contention's
validity.

2 38

It may, however, be possible to soften the conclusion that conscientious-objector
exemptions violate the Establishment Clause on third-party grounds by a corollary
position: even if conscientious exemptions were unconstitutional when limited to
religious objectors, their constitutionality was saved by Seeger and Welsh. That is,
when exemptions were limited to religious objectors, third parties were burdened
only to accommodate another's religious beliefs and were therefore constitutionally
problematic. But when exemption eligibility was expanded to nontheistic objectors
233 Cf. Garnett supra, note 10, 46-49 (contending that because religion is a public good there is no

constitutional requirement that accommodating religion must be 'cost-free.')
234

See, e.g., Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 261-65 (1934) (holding there

was no constitutional right to a conscientious-objection exemption on grounds other than it might impose
burdens on third parties).
235 The Caldoropinionalludes to one such rationale. In addition to
relying on harms to third parties,
the Court also indicated that a provision may run afoul of the Establishment Clause if it creates an
"unyielding weighting" in favor of religious interests. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703,
710-11 (1985). That included, according to the Court, not just that the statute imposed a burden on third
parties, but also that the statute did not allow for any consideration of whether the employer had made
accommodation proposals. Id. at 709-10.
236
237

Id. at 703.
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).

238 See Laycock, supra note 12, at 1796 (arguing that the fact that religious exemptions generally were
not historically thought to raise Establishment Clause concerns supports the conclusion that exemptions
are not constitutionally problematic).
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in Seege?39 and, more importantly, to nonreligious objectors in Welsh, 240 that was
no longer the case. The third-party burden argument then no longer applied.
The potential weakness in this argument, however, lies in the Seeger and Welsh
decisions themselves. The Court in those cases did not appear to expand
conscientious-objector eligibility to include nonreligous beliefs. Rather, it extended
the meaning of "religious training and belief' to include certain types of beliefs that
could otherwise be characterized as nonreligious. 241' Accordingly, even after Seeger
and Welsh, third parties would still be burdened by having to serve because of the
accommodation of the objectors' 'religious' beliefs. 242
The final possible inference to be drawn from the conscientious-objector
exemption example is that there is no implication at all. Conscientious objection to
war simply raises unique issues that are not transferable to other types of religious
exemptions. Two reasons support this assertion. The first is simply the standardissue tenet in constitutional law that issues surrounding war and the military require
greater deference to the government than in other areas. Thus, constitutional rights
are not as stringently enforced when they affect war and military issues. 243 Similar
deference might then be appropriate in response to the Establishment Clause
third-party burden challenge.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, it could also be argued that, in some
critical respects, the third-party burden issue plays out differently in the
conscientious-objector context than in other areas. In the case of conscientious
objection, not granting exemptions to conscientious objectors imposes serious
burdens on third parties. Those sharing the foxhole, the cockpit, or the warship with
the conscientious objector may themselves be endangered if the objector abides by
his religious principles and does not raise arms against the enemy. 244 Further,
including in fighting units conscientious objectors expressing the belief that killing
is sinful may undermine the unit's morale or destabilize its cohesion, again subjecting
third parties to potential harms.
239

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66, 185-88 (1965).

240 Welsh

v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1970).

241 See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342-43; see also Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185-86.
242 The third parties, of course, would still be burdened in the same way even if conscientious

exemptions were explicitly expanded to include nonreligious beliefs. It is unclear, however, whether
imposing burdens on third parties by exempting nonreligious beliefs triggers constitutional scrutiny either
under the Establishment Clause or any other constitutional provision. For an argument that the thirdparty burden argument would apply even if conscientious exemptions were extended to nonreligious
beliefs see Micah Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe & Richard Schragger, The Costs ofConscience, 106 KY.

LJ. 781, 803-05 (2018).
243 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504, 507-10 (1986) (finding against a Free Exercise

Clause challenge to military dress regulations); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 831-34, 837-38, 840 (1976)
(finding against a Free Speech Clause challenge to military reservation regulations); Katcoffv. Marsh, 755

F.2d 223, 225, 228-29, 235-38 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding military chaplaincy against an Establishment
Clause challenge); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The Military
Chaplaincyand the Constitution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 89, 95-96 (2007) (noting that the KatcoffCourt
gave considerable deference to the military in ruling that military chaplaincy was permissible under the
Establishment Clause).
244 See GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 31.
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Excusing conscientious objectors from combatant service thus serves some
third-party interests (though not the interests of the third party drafted in place of
the objector) as well as the religious interest of the objector. 245 It also furthers the
interest of the military in molding its fighting force. In contrast, exempting religious
objectors from requirements such as having to work on Saturdays or providing
contraceptive coverage neither benefits third parties nor assists the government in
carrying out its programs. Accordingly, unlike in other areas, the burdens that
conscientious-objector exemptions place on third parties do not stem solely from the
government's choosing to protect religious belief. What is not clear, however, is
whether this recognition does, or should, affect third-party burden analysis.
CONCLUSION

The claim that religious exemptions that impose burdens on third parties are
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause is in considerable tension with the
long-standing practice of granting conscientious-objectors exemptions from
combatant military service. The religious objector who is required to kill in violation
of his religious beliefs may suffer the most egregious violation of "one of the most
deeply held obligations of conscience." 246 The third party who is required to serve in
place of the objector may suffer both the burden of killing another and the risk that

he will be killed himself.
Surprisingly, however, the question of whether conscientious-objector
exemptions improperly impose third-party burdens did not receive much attention
in the historical debates or in the major cases addressing conscientious objection.
This absence might suggest that the third-party burden claim is misguided. After all,
if the exemption that arguably inflicts the most serious burdens on third parties has
not been thought to raise constitutional concerns, then the doctrine cannot be of
much force.
Alternatively, it could be maintained that the historical record contains a glaring
omission, and conscientious objections to war are unconstitutional. If so, however,
such a result would be particularly striking given that conscientious-objector
exemptions are so deeply rooted in American history and that eliminating them
would so harshly affect those conscientiously opposed to war.
There is also a third possibility. Conscientious objection may raise unique
constitutional concerns that are not transferable to other religious exemption issues.
If so, conscientious objector exemptions may survive constitutional scrutiny even if
the third-party burden claim is valid in other contexts. The historical record,
however, provides no clear guidance as to which of these options is the most
warranted.

245 The military may also benefit from granting conscientious-objector exemptions
by allowing it to
avoid the adverse effects on public and military morale that can come with prosecuting or imprisoning
those who oppose war on the basis of deeply-held and sincere religious principles.
246 Laycock, supra note 12, at 1808.

